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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3441 
___________ 
 
FENG MEI XIU, a/k/a Feng Mei Xu, 
  Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
     Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A079 447 466) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 13, 2013 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 06, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Feng Mei Xiu, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a decision of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion to reopen her 
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immigration proceedings.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
 In 2005, an Immigration Judge found Xiu removable from the United States 
because she did not have a valid entry or travel document.  The Immigration Judge also 
denied Xiu‟s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 
Convention Against Torture.  Xiu had claimed that she feared persecution by the Chinese 
police because she had sold Falun Gong materials at her bookstand.  The BIA affirmed 
the IJ‟s decision and we denied Xiu‟s petition for review.  Xiu v. Att‟y Gen., 227 F. 
App‟x 113 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished decision). 
 In 2012, Xiu, through counsel, filed a motion to reopen her immigration 
proceedings in order to apply for asylum.  Xiu asserted that, since her merits hearing, 
conditions in China have changed and there has been increased persecution of Christians 
who practice their religion in unauthorized churches.  Xiu stated that she began attending 
a Christian church in Brooklyn, New York in 2010, that she will not join the government-
sanctioned churches in China because they do not follow the true teachings of the Bible, 
and that she will be arrested if she is found in an unauthorized religious gathering.   
 The BIA denied the motion as untimely, deciding that Xiu‟s “evidence [was] 
inadequate to establish a change in circumstances or country conditions „arising in the 
country of nationality‟ so as to create an exception to the time and number limitation for 
filing a late motion to reopen to apply for asylum.”  A.R. at 4.  This petition for review 
followed. 
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We review the denial of a 
motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.  Khan v. Att‟y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 495 (3d Cir. 
2012).   
 A motion to reopen removal proceedings must generally be filed within 90 days of 
the final administrative decision.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  There is no time limit, 
however, on the filing of a motion to reopen to apply for asylum or withholding of 
removal “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the 
country to which removal has been ordered . . . .”  Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  Although 
Xiu‟s claim is based on a new religious practice or a change in her personal 
circumstances, an alien may file an asylum application based on changed personal 
circumstances beyond the 90-day statutory period if he or she can also show changed 
country conditions.  Liu v. Att‟y Gen. 555 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Xiu asserts in her brief that the BIA failed to address the arguments she raised in 
her motion to reopen and that the BIA‟s decision that she did not establish changed 
country conditions is devoid of any reasoning.  In her motion to reopen, Xiu argued that 
three events had occurred since her merits hearing that have led to escalating persecution 
of Christians attending unauthorized churches in China and specifically in Fujian 
Province, her home province.  Xiu explained that increased persecution was the result of 
new regulations expanding protection for registered, but not unregistered, religious 
groups, the 2008 Olympic Games in China, and protests in the Middle East in 2011.  Xiu 
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submitted documentation in support of her motion, which included articles reporting 
increased arrests of Christians attending unregistered churches. 
 The Government contends that the events referred to by Xiu, and the evidence 
submitted in support of her motion, do not establish changed country conditions.  The 
BIA, however, did not address Xiu‟s arguments and we may only review the BIA‟s 
decision based on the rationale it provided.  SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 
(1947); Konan v. Att‟y Gen., 432 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2005).  The BIA‟s decision does 
not discuss whether conditions in China have changed.  Instead, the BIA noted the 
current conditions in China reflected in U.S. Department of State Reports, which it stated 
were the best source of information, and concluded that this evidence did not reflect that 
Xiu will suffer mistreatment amounting to persecution.  These statements do not explain 
the BIA‟s ruling that Xiu did not show changed country conditions excusing her untimely 
filing.  See Zheng v. Att‟y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting authority 
providing that the BIA should provide more than conclusory statements so that a court 
can discern its reasons for denying relief).   
 The Government further argues that any failure by the BIA to explain its decision 
that Xiu did not show changed country conditions is harmless in light of its conclusion 
that current conditions do not reflect that she will be persecuted.  The BIA‟s decision is 
ambiguous as to whether it determined that Xiu did not establish the prima facie case for 
relief required for reopening or whether it conflated this question with the distinct 
question of changed country conditions.  See Shardar v. Att‟y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 312 
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(3d Cir. 2007) (explaining changed country conditions and the merits of a prima facie 
case asylum claim are “related but analytically distinct issues”).  We conclude that, even 
if the BIA conflated these questions, no relief is due because Xiu did not demonstrate that 
reopening is warranted on the merits of her asylum claim.   
 The BIA‟s conclusion that Xiu did not show that she will suffer mistreatment 
amounting to persecution if removed to China is supported by the 2011 Annual Report of 
the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom and the 2010 International 
Religious Freedom Report cited in its decision.  As such, a remand on the issue of 
changed country conditions would not change the result in her case.  We are not 
persuaded by Xiu‟s arguments that the BIA failed to assess the evidence under a prima 
facie standard or that the BIA did not consider her evidence because it found certain 
documents previously available or incomplete.
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 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
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1Judge Ambro dissents because, in his view, the BIA‟s decision does not reflect that it 
applied the proper standards in evaluating Xiu‟s motion to reopen.  Judge Ambro 
concludes that, in addition to the lack of explanation on the question of changed country 
conditions, the BIA‟s decision does not reflect that it considered whether Xiu established 
prima facie eligibility for asylum, which only required showing a reasonable likelihood 
that she can establish that she is entitled to relief.  Shardar, 503 F.3d at 313.  He finds 
that, to the extent the BIA held Xiu to a higher burden of proof, the BIA‟s apparent 
conflating of the issues of changed country conditions and the merits of her asylum claim 
was not harmless and a remand is warranted. 
 
2Xiu‟s request for oral argument is denied.  
